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The Crisis of Late Structuralism
Perspectivism and Animism: Rethinking 
Culture, Nature, Spirit, and Bodiliness
TERENCE TURNER 
Cornell University
tst3@cornell.edu
THE PASSING OF LÉVI-STRAUSS
 The death of Claude Lévi-Strauss in November 2009 was an event 
that called for due commemoration of a brilliant anthropological career. 
It was also an occasion that called upon his epigones and critics among 
Amazonian anthropologists, as well as the many thinkers from other lines 
of intellectual and cultural work who were inspired and influenced by 
his ideas, to contemplate the nature of his contribution and the extent 
to which it remains a vital force which continues to influence theoretical 
work in the social and cultural disciplines.
 The excitement stimulated by the earlier works of Lévi-Strauss 
derived from three original theoretical contributions. Firstly, the new 
theoretical and methodological approach represented by his synthetic 
concept of “structure”, fully presented for the first time in The Elementary 
Structures of Kinship (1949), combined the mathematical idea of a group 
of transformations constrained by one or more invariant principles (not 
previously applied in anthropology, although used at least a century 
earlier in economics by Marx among others), the semiotic notions of 
classification developed by Saussure in his concepts of the sign and the 
field of signification, the componential phonology of the Prague School 
linguists Troubetzkoy and Jakobson, psychological associationism, gestalt 
ideas of pattern perception, and anthropological notions of comparative 
typologies of kinship systems and cultural systems of categories. It was a 
bold and creative synthesis drawn from disparate sources, many of which 
were unfamiliar to the anthropologists of the day.
 Secondly, Lévi-Strauss offered a powerful new idea of the ultimate 
object of anthropological analysis, the “fundamental structures of the 
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human mind,” which he conceived as the invariant constraints governing 
the groups of transformations comprising his structural models, rendered 
accessible by the methodological application of his new concept of structure. 
These were invariably conceived as psychological or social psychological 
principles like reciprocity or the distinction between nature and culture. 
They constituted sign posts on the way to Lévi-Strauss’s ultimate goal of 
reducing culture to psychology and psychology to the natural processes 
of perception and unconscious association that produce the categories of 
cognition and classification. The end of this analytical trajectory as Lévi-
Strauss conceived it was the revelation of nature as both the ultimate 
transcendental subject and the source of the cognitive features of objective 
reality. These ideas comprised Lévi-Strauss’s idea of anthropology’s way of 
answering the big question that was its reason for being, to wit “what is 
the nature of humanity”? He was perhaps the last major anthropologist to 
make the quest for an answer to that question the focus of his career.
 Thirdly, Lévi-Strauss can be said to have discovered a new subject matter 
for anthropological analysis: the apparently arbitrary and meaningless 
details of indigenous myths, cosmologies and systems of knowledge, which 
he recognized could be analyzed as the code of logical oppositions and 
identities that constituted the cognitive structures of culture.
 The three-fold analytical program based on these three fundamental 
theoretical innovations exercised great influence on anthropology and 
related fields, even among many who remained skeptical of Lévi-Strauss’s 
own analytical practice and his ultimate theoretical goals. It took time for 
critical thinkers to digest the ideas and clarify their problematic aspects 
both in theory and in application. Among the many criticisms that have 
been leveled at the structuralist edifice, three stand out for their relevance to 
this paper. Firstly, there is a fundamental flaw in Lévi-Strauss’s application 
of his theoretical model of structure, which can be summed up as applying 
the right model to the wrong level of the data. Lévi-Strauss followed the 
conventional conceptions of contemporary semiotics and kinship studies in 
conceiving the formal organization of individual kinship systems or myths 
as synchronic tableaux of relations or feature contrasts, leaving no room for 
internal transformations such as those of mythical plots or developmental 
cycles of families. He was therefore obliged to try to apply his structural 
model of groups of transformations bounded by invariant constraints to 
sets of multiple myths or kinship systems, each considered as a unitary 
“transform” or “variant” of a master structure (embodied by the invariant 
principle or principles that supposedly comprise the boundary condition 
of the group) that cannot be located or defined within any member of 
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the group—nor, as it has turned out, anywhere else. Neither Lévi-Strauss 
nor any other avowed structuralist has ever succeeded, to my knowledge, 
in producing a single analysis of the structure of any “group” of “variants” 
of any cultural construct or kinship system that actually meets the formal 
requirements of “invariance” specified by Levi-Strauss. This does not mean 
that the model itself is unviable or inapplicable, only that it has not been 
applied where it should have been, to wit the  internal transformations 
comprising the developmental processes or plots of the individual systems 
in question (kinship systems or mythical narratives), which do form 
“groups” of transformations constrained to remain within invariant limits 
by the overriding requirement of reproducing the system of relations or 
schematic pattern of symbolic actions in question. If this were done first, 
the results of these analyses might then be compared at a second level as 
a “group” of analogous cases, but what one would be comparing would be 
quite different from the synchronic “variants” that comprise structuralist 
analyses. A fatal consequence of the synchronizing of the internal patterns of 
relations comprising the “variants” or “transforms” of structuralist analyses 
is the flattening of their constituent elements into inert, disarticulated 
relational or sign-elements deprived of many of the intentional and 
dynamic (transformative) meanings they have in their original systemic 
context. This is a point with equal relevance to structuralism and some of 
its more recent offspring.
 The other two main points of Lévi-Strauss’s original structuralist 
synthesis are also adversely affected by the unviability of his approach 
to structural analysis. His inability to apply his structural model to the 
structure of individual systems or “transforms” meant that he was never 
able to define invariant constraints coordinating any “group” of transforms 
as “fundamental structures” with the precision demanded by his group-
theoretic definition of structure. His characterization of his procedure for 
analyzing “groups” of myths in the “overture” to The Raw and the Cooked 
(1969) as analogous to a growing crystal which is clearly structured at its 
center but fuzzy and ill-defined at its periphery metaphorically evokes his 
failure to find the structure of any such group—which means, given his 
definition of structure as the invariant law of the group, his failure to find 
the structure of any myth. The massive outpouring of unstructured analyses 
of mythical patterns and transformations comprising the four volumes of 
the Mythologiques, stimulating as they are, represent by Lévi-Strauss’s own 
theoretical standards the failure of his structuralist quest for fundamental 
structures (Lévi-Strauss 1964:9-40).1
 When he moved on from kinship structures to myth and systems of 
3
The Crisis of Late Structuralism. Perspectivism and Animism: Reth
Published by Digital Commons @ Trinity, 2009
6	 Terence	Turner
knowledge as his principal subjects, Lévi-Strauss’s attempts to translate 
the significata of the semiotic elements of myths and cosmological systems 
were likewise hobbled by his inability to recognize the significance of the 
fact that such individual elements are regularly transformed in the course 
of the myth or social process in question—transformations that apply to 
their signification as well as to features of their form or relations with other 
elements. In the Gê and Bororo myths of the origin  of cooking fire that 
constitute the initial subject of The Raw and the Cooked, for example, the 
fire makes its first appearance as the distant sun in the sky, which men use 
to warm meat that they must cut into small pieces and set out on rocks to 
catch its rays, then descends to earth as the burning end of  a log in the 
house of the jaguars, who use it to roast big pieces of meat, and finally 
ends up being carried by men to their village, where it is broken up and 
used to light other cooking fires (Lévi-Strauss 1964:43-86). Each of these 
transformations of the fire carries a different signification, and this series 
of transformations conveys a cumulative meaning that is the point of the 
myth. Lévi-Strauss analyzes the fire only as the sign of the operation of 
cooking, a function it exercised in the pre-cultural house of the jaguars, 
missing completely the significance of its use at the end of the myth as 
a general means of making other fires, the essential step to full human 
culture.
 In approaching a critique of the development of structuralism or the 
ideas of its more recent theoretical epigones, it is essential to bear in mind 
that none of them have developed as purely academic anthropological 
projects. Rather, they and their authors have all to varying degrees led double 
lives as public intellectuals, engaged in supra-academic controversies of 
their times. Since its beginnings shortly after World War II, structuralism 
was framed by its advocates as much as a critique of Modern Western 
philosophical and social thought, in particular existentialism, Marxism, 
hermeneutics, and structural-functional social anthropology, as an 
anthropological approach concerned with the kinship systems and myths 
of indigenous Australian and Amerindian cultures. The brilliant career of 
Lévi-Strauss exemplifies this double focus of the structuralist project, with 
its combination of anthropological interest in the more remote and exotic 
cultures of aboriginal Australia and the Amazon and its borrowings from 
currently modish scientific theories of structural linguistics and semiology, 
Merleau-Ponty’s work on the psychology of perception, and what Lévi-
Strauss called the new “mathematics of Man”, the “qualitative math” of 
set theory, cybernetics and information technology that became popular 
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following World War II (Lévi-Strauss 1955).
 The success of structuralism as an intellectual movement owed much 
to this double focus, with its seductive methodological implications that 
the “fundamental structures” of human mental operations, manifested in 
their purest and simplest forms in the cultural productions of the most 
“primitive” (i.e., by implication, the most “natural”) human cultures, bear a 
family resemblance to the new methods of structural analysis in linguistics 
and group theory, thus lending their scientific cachet to structuralist 
anthropology. This complex intellectual heritage helps to understand 
one of the more problematic aspects of structuralism and its more recent 
offshoots from an anthropological perspective, namely its tendency to 
reify general conceptual categories such as “nature” and “culture” and to 
treat them on the same footing as ethnographic evidence for indigenous 
ideas about what can be defined in terms of these categories as “natural” 
or “cultural” phenomena. One consequence of this is a tendency to treat 
entities or relations that can be attributed to one category or the other as 
internally homogeneous, rather than as complex amalgams of both. This 
tendency is accentuated by a theoretical reliance on Saussurean semiology, 
in  particular its concepts of the sign, the field of signification, and the 
distinction of langue and parole as models for cultural classifications and 
cosmologies, which push analyses in an idealist direction towards the 
abstraction of epistemological and classificatory categories from forms of 
material activity and social relations.
 As an anthropologist working with Gê-speaking people of Central 
Brazil, who have played a central role in the formation of Lévi-Strauss’s 
ideas about Amazonian social structure and mythology, I have inevitably 
found myself carrying on my ethnographic and theoretical work in a 
personal and conceptual dialogue with Lévi-Strauss: conceptual, because 
his writings pointed me toward problems and ideas that became central 
to my own work; and personal, because like many fellow Amazonianists I 
found him to be a lively and interested interlocutor, invariably receptive and 
generous with his time when I would call on him when in Paris. I began 
my work with the Kayapo in 1962, when the influence of Lévi-Strauss was 
at its height, and “structuralism” had become a focus of intense interest and 
controversy, not only in France but increasingly in Anglophone, Hispanic 
and Lusophone anthropological and cultural circles. Since the end of the 
‘60s, I have witnessed (and to a small degree participated in) the decline of 
its intellectual eminence, which was hastened, if not caused, by the events 
of May 1968 in Paris.
5
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MAY 1968 AS ANTI-STRUCTURALIST REVOLT
 The waning of the influence of structuralism as a theoretical approach 
within anthropology, as well as in literary and cultural studies more 
generally, that began after 1968 was gradual and never total. While Lévi-
Strauss continued to teach and produce published works at an amazing 
rate, he nevertheless became an increasingly isolated figure without direct 
intellectual heirs. Structuralism, however, has enjoyed a prolonged half-life 
in various ostensibly “post-structuralist” and “deconstructionist” recensions, 
which have continued some of structuralism’s most fundamental tenets in 
different terms. Chief among these was Lévi-Strauss’s failure to produce 
“structural” analyses which satisfied his own criteria for structure, thus 
making him, in effect, a pioneer of post-structuralism avant l ’heure.
 The students and workers of May ‘68 did not adorn their barricades 
with banners calling for the defense of langue, but with the demand to 
prendre la parole. They had not sought to defend existing structures but 
to deconstruct them. They were not concerned with the contemplation of 
objectified patterns of unconscious thought but with subjective action that 
might change and create new forms of consciousness as well as materially 
transform existing social relations. Parisian philosophers reacted to what 
they perceived as the 1968 crisis of structuralism as a perspective founded 
upon a contemplative, Saussurean notion of structure by repudiating 
the aspects of Lévi-Strauss’s thought that appeared most out of keeping 
with the new ideological climate, which had been germinating in the 
universities, factories and other social contexts before it burst into the open 
in the demonstrations of May ‘68.
 That the epigones of the structuralist hegemony managed to conserve 
key aspects of Lévi-Strauss’s theoretical synthesis and to recycle them 
as components of the new ostensibly anti-structuralist positions they 
developed is an impressive tribute to the hold that structuralism had 
acquired over the French cultural imagination. An even more telling 
tribute is how many, in their haste to redefine themselves as post-
structuralists, energetically asserted, against the evidence of their own 
previous writings, that of course they had never been structuralists. The 
post-1968 succession of hybrid theoretical formations that followed did 
not so much overtly confront and overcome the theoretical and analytical 
problems of structuralism as readapt them in new forms that would appear 
to make virtues of its theoretical vices. It is this post-1968 succession of 
hybrid theoretical formations, juxtaposed with the continued outpouring 
of new but theoretically repetitious work by Lévi-Strauss himself, that I 
refer to as the crisis of Late Structuralism.
6
Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/tipiti/vol7/iss1/1
 The	Crisis	of	Late	Structuralism	 9
 The most notable among the hybrid positions to emerge in the 
immediate aftermath of the events of 1968 came from philosophers 
and public intellectuals rather than from anthropologists. They included 
Derrida’s heterodox interpretation of Saussure’s theory of the sign, which 
Lévi-Strauss had employed as the basis of his concept of structures of sign-
elements, as the basis of decentered anti-structures (Derrida 1967). Derrida 
managed this by reinterpreting Saussure’s notion of the arbitrariness of 
the signifier-signified relation as an existential gulf of “différance” of the 
supposed original unity of signifier and signified. The original model for 
Derrida’s notion of déférence may be sought in Lévi-Strauss’s notion of the 
incest tabu as a requirement that men should give away their consanguineal 
female relations as sexual partners in reciprocal affinal exchanges with 
other men, thus deferring the primal unity of familial relations, rather than 
follow their supposed natural preference to retain them in incestuous (pre-
social) unity.
 A different tack was taken by Foucault’s inversion of Lévi-Strauss’s use 
of Saussure’s concept of langue as the model of his conception of structure 
(which Foucault himself had employed in his pre-1968 structuralist period. 
In a clear break with Lévi-Strauss, Foucault offered a transvaluation of 
Saussure’s fundamental distinction of langue and parole which artfully 
co-opted the rhetoric of the movement of 1968, substituting for langue 
as the foundational category of his “post-structuralist” system the 
complementary Saussurean category of parole, reworked and rebaptized as 
discours (Foucault 1968). His conception of discourse, however, departed 
from Saussure’s concept of parole in its denial of any role for the subject 
as speaker. Instead, he continued to conceive it in the approved austere 
Lévi-Straussian fashion as subjectless, like langue, in effect as a kind of 
activated form of langue, now understood as a structuring demiurge of 
“power”, imposing subjective identities on social persons to enable them to 
serve the needs of power, which turn out to be the requirements of social 
structure. Althusser produced an analogous theory of the subject as an 
“interpellation” of society as a corollary of his “structuralist Marxist” theory 
of ideology (Althusser 1971).
 These avowedly anti- or post-Lévi-Straussian theoretical positions 
were actually formulated as continuations of essential aspects of the 
theoretical framework of Lévi-Straussian structuralism by other means, 
above all the concept of the subject as an epiphenomenon of impersonal, 
unconscious linguistic or ideological structures, and the consequent 
irrelevance or illusoriness of subjective consciousness, agency and material 
activity.
 
7
The Crisis of Late Structuralism. Perspectivism and Animism: Reth
Published by Digital Commons @ Trinity, 2009
10	 Terence	Turner
THE CRISIS OF LATE STRUCTURALISM:
ANIMISM AND PERSPECTIVISM AS SUCCESSORS
 Anthropologists were also influenced by the social and ideological 
upheaval of the late 1960s and the new emphases on social action and 
subjective agency that followed from them, but they also responded to 
distinct influences arising from their discipline’s concerns with the 
interaction of human subjects with the natural environment and the social 
meanings and cultural treatments of the human body. All of these concerns 
informed the reactions within the discipline to the twin crises of Lévi-
Straussian structuralism: the failure of his own project of structural analysis 
to reveal the structures he sought, and the rejection of structuralism as a 
quietist theoretical dead-end incapable of dealing with the realities of the 
contemporary social and cultural inequities of French society, in particular 
its class structure and educational system, but also, in the cases we shall 
consider here, to the post-structuralist and deconstructionist reactions of 
Foucault, Derrida and others.
 Among anthropologists deeply engaged with, and influenced by, 
Lévi-Strauss’s theoretical framework, the two most important critical 
tendencies that have emerged have been the revival of theoretical and 
ethnographic work on Animism by Descola, Bird-David and others (Bird-
David 1999; Descola 1994, 1996, 2005, 2009), and the development of 
Perspectivism as an approach to indigenous Amazonian, and more broadly, 
Amerindian cosmological notions by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, his 
students and associates (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 
2004). In both cases, the theorists who initially developed these positions 
either began as Lévi-Straussian structuralists (the case of Viveiros de 
Castro, a Francophone Brazilian closely involved with Lévi-Strauss and 
French anthropology) or as in the case of Descola (a student of Godelier 
with ecological and Marxist leanings) formulated their ideas in a critical 
dialogue with his vision. Both of these approaches began by challenging 
Lévi-Strauss’s central conception of the relation of nature and culture, and 
of its role as the frame of his vision of anthropology as “entropology”, the 
reduction of culture to the status of an epiphenomenon of nature. Lévi-
Strauss conceived the reduction of culture to nature as operating through 
the medium of the determination of subjective consciousness by an 
objective “Kantian” unconscious constituted by the neurological apparatus 
of perception and the Gestalt-like patterns of association it transmitted to 
the conscious mind.
 Perspectivism proceeded by turning Lévi-Strauss’s reductionist 
proposition inside out through an equally radical but opposite reduction 
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of nature to culture, achieved through the elevation of subjective 
perspective over objective associationism as the determining constituent 
of the “spiritual” identities of all creatures, animals and humans alike. 
The foundational claim of perspectivism is that indigenous Amazonians 
believe that animals, as the archetypal “natural” creatures, subjectively 
identify themselves as humans, the archetypal cultural beings. Animism 
arrived at an analogous claim for the universality of the spiritual identity, 
presumed to be essentially human and thus cultural, of humans and all 
natural entities (including animals, plants and some inanimate beings such 
as celestial bodies) by way of Descola’s ethnographic documentation of 
the social relations between human and non-human beings among the 
Achuar, resulting in a pragmatic blurring of the boundary between the 
natural and cultural domains through a spiritual and material infiltration 
of each domain by beings from the other category.
Both animism and perspectivism thus take as their point of departure a 
reconception of the relation of nature and culture through an exploration of 
indigenous conceptions of the common subjectivity of cultural and natural 
beings, while diverging on a series of philosophical and theoretical points. 
Both tendencies have moved away from basic aspects of Lévi-Strauss’s 
thought, as well as from each other, but both have continued in different 
ways to work within the framework of Lévi-Strauss’s master concept of 
the categorical opposition of nature and culture as the basic concern of 
Amazonian, and more broadly Amerindian cosmologies, despite their 
otherwise heterodox reformulations of its terms. Both sides have presented 
their positions in rhetorically provocative articles clearly intended to invite 
critical engagement. I offer the following remarks in the spirit of a collegial 
response to this invitation, from the perspective (sic) of yet another former 
fellow traveler of the structuralist project.
NATURE AND CULTURE:
THE WOLVERINE AND THE PANSY
 The attraction of structuralism for both anthropologists and humanist 
intellectuals in its earlier years seemed only to be intensified by its rejection of 
foundational concepts and concerns of conventional philosophical, textual 
and anthropological analysis—e.g. consciousness, meaning, production, 
history, form (as distinct from “structure”), the subject (including 
perspective, intentionality, agency, Freudian psychodynamics and affect), 
and all aspects of language falling within the Saussurean category of speech 
or discourse, from syntax, deixis, object reference, and discourse forms such 
9
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as narrative, to the social pragmatics of speech in context), to select a few 
headings from a longer list. Another factor contributing to the curious 
prestige of structuralist analyses was their preoccupation with the exotic 
and apparently arbitrary and unmotivated details of indigenous myths, 
rituals and cosmologies involving unfamiliar animals, plants and natural 
forms, which it was the great achievement of Lévi-Strauss to bring within 
the purview of a theoretical vision able to recognize their significance.
 Lévi-Strauss’s concern with these particulars was integral to his 
conception of the great theme of the Amerindian myths, as well as that of 
structuralist anthropology: the relation of nature and culture. Lévi-Strauss 
conceived of this relation on two levels. On the one hand, he interpreted 
the Amerindian myths recounting the differentiation of humanity and 
culture from a state of nature once shared on more or less equal terms 
with animals as expressions of the natural mental processes of perception 
and association through which he believed cultural forms are constructed. 
On the other hand, he sought to understand how the sensuous forms 
and properties of natural entities such as flowers or animal species are 
unconsciously appropriated by the perceptual apparatus and related to 
one another by cognitive psychological processes of association to form 
cultural structures like classification and representation. Lévi-Strauss 
has thus always conceived of the process of construction of basic cultural 
structures as psychological and unconscious, rather than as an aspect of 
intentional (conscious, subjective) social interaction, and conceived the 
product of the process, the structures or structural variants themselves, as 
abstract synchronic patterns rather than as including the transformational 
operations through which  they were produced. Cultural structures, in other 
words, may be conceived as practico-inert transforms of a more inclusive 
set of related structural “variants,” but not as themselves transformational 
processes.
 The synthesis at which he arrived, set out in The Savage Mind (in 
French, La Pensée Sauvage, a pun meaning both “natural thought” and 
“wild pansy”) was concisely evoked by the visual layout of the book’s cover, 
which shows a picture of a wild pansy below the French title on the front 
and a wolverine, celebrated in the text for its intelligence, on the back 
cover. The book as an object thus constitutes a “sensuous gestalt” (the term 
comes from Merleau-Ponty, to whom the book is dedicated), encoding 
the message of the book that the human mind, in its natural state, is 
constituted by the relation between the sensuous forms of the natural 
world (the pansy) and the natural mental faculties of perception and 
association (the wolverine). Culture and the ideational content of subjective 
consciousness are represented by the pages of text encompassed by the 
10
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two covers. Structural analysis as Lévi-Strauss conceived it thus became 
a sort of ironic reductionism, or in his term an “entropology”, revealing 
how human cultures in their very attempts to construct representations 
of their differentiation from nature ironically succeed only in producing 
constructs which reveal in their form and content culture’s true character 
as an epiphenomenon of nature. The outcome of the structuralist analysis 
of human cultural forms is therefore the reduction of humans and their 
cultures to their true status as products of nature’s interaction with itself, 
employing humans as the unwitting medium of the process.
 For Lévi-Strauss, the important point was the natural quality of the 
faculties and substantive contents of human mentation and culture, but in 
emphasizing this he was also obliged to recognize the logical implication 
that these natural sensory and cognitive faculties could not be conceived 
as exclusively human, but must be understood as qualities of mind and 
intelligence shared with other natural beings, which is why the wolverine 
found its way onto the back cover of La Pensée Sauvage. In this way, Lévi-
Strauss’s structuralism opened the possibility of a more radical theoretical 
exploration of the sharing of mind or spirit by humans with animals and 
other natural entities.
 The major obstacle to this opening appeared to be the limitations 
of the major constituents of structuralist theory itself, associationist 
psychology, the approach to structure as synchronic pattern abstracted 
from the transformational processes of its production, and above all the 
strait-jacket of Saussurean semiotics, with its fixation on langue to the 
exclusion of parole, signification to the exclusion of reference and meaning, 
and abstract objectivity to the exclusion of subjective consciousness, 
intention and agency. As these limitations became increasingly evident to 
later generations of structuralistes receptive to new anthropological interests 
in subjectivity, agency, and the integration of human culture in ecological 
systems, the ascetic grandeur of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist vision came 
to be felt more and more as the product of an ironic limitation all its 
own: the theoretical and methodological inadequacy of his use of his own 
concept of structure. New ethnographic work carried out in the light of 
new interests in cultural modes of subjective consciousness, constructions 
of bodiliness, and interactions with the environment led to attempts to 
formulate more holistic approaches to the relation of culture and society 
with animals, plants and the natural environment. It must be emphasized, 
at the same time, that much of this new work took inspiration from Lévi-
Strauss’s ideas of the natural sources of mind and culture, following out the 
implications of his suggestions that the structures and contents of mind 
and intelligence are not specifically human possessions, but are shared 
11
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with natural beings. Descola’s revision of animism, with its emphasis on 
relations with plants as well as animals and other natural entities, was in 
the forefront of this new cultural ecology.
 Lévi-Strauss conceived the nature-culture relation ambiguously as both 
external and internal: externally as a boundary between human culture and 
the world of nature beyond the village; and internally as the psychological 
divide between the mental processes of perception and association and the 
consciousness of the cultural subject. Across this psychological frontier, the 
former confront the latter as objective extensions of the external natural 
world they mediate to the latter. The forms of this mediation, in Lévi-
Strauss’s conception, are thus not only themselves continuations of the 
objective natural environment but serve as the transcendental categories 
of consciousness and subjectivity. Subjectivity and meaning, in this 
perspective, become epiphenomena of the objective forms and processes of 
nature. At the theoretical level, this may be taken to imply a reduction of 
culture to nature. This, as we have seen, was Lévi-Strauss’s view, embodied 
by the wolverine on the cover of la Pensée Sauvage—the exemplar of Lévi-
Strauss’s conception of the naturalness of the mental processes that also 
constitute the foundation of human culture and consciousness.
 The wolverine itself, however, is not a cultural subject, for all its raw 
intelligence.  Lévi-Strauss’s naturalistic epistemological idealism implicitly 
raises but does not answer the difficult question of the existence of subjectivity, 
the product, if not the source, of natural intelligence and perception in 
humans, in “natural” beings.  If human culture and subjective consciousness 
is asserted to rest upon a foundation of natural psychological processes and 
gestalt-like patterns of sensory features of objects of perception, are we to 
infer that the possession of such natural mental faculties and the ubiquity 
of sensory gestalten in the natural objective world implies the existence of 
superstructures of subjective consciousness, intentionality and even cultural 
identity on the part of all beings thus endowed? A positive answer to this 
question may take two main forms, one emphasizing the subjective aspect 
of mind as self-identity, the other the objective, material consequences 
of subjective identity for relations with other beings (especially humans). 
Either way, the structuralist concept of the relation of nature and culture 
as mutually external, contrastive domains becomes unsustainable. The 
attempt to reformulate this fundamental relationship in the context of an 
answer to the question of the nature of the mentality of natural beings has 
thus become the focus of the crisis of Late Structuralism.
 The first way of dealing with the question is to recognize that 
if animals, plants, heavenly bodies and spirits are conceived to have 
subjective consciousness, then the paradoxical indication, given the 
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orthodox structuralist interpretation of the binary opposition between 
nature and culture, in terms of which subjective consciousness is relegated 
to the domain of culture, is that they may share the conscious identity of 
human (cultural) subjects. The radical implication is that what orthodox 
structuralists had considered the domain of nature is really a psychological 
and epistemological colony of the domain of culture: natural beings 
have, in short, become cultural beings, at least as far as they themselves 
are concerned. This conclusion, reached by impeccable structuralist logic, 
nevertheless clearly stands in contradiction to the orthodox structuralist 
conception of the nature-culture relation as a privative opposition of 
natural/objective and cultural/subjective domains. In so doing, it offers a 
way (however bizarre) to move beyond it.
 The second way of dealing with the same question proceeds from the 
realization that if natural beings are conceived as possessing not only “wild” 
intelligence and qualities of mind (i.e., la pensée sauvage) but subjective 
identity that includes personhood and culture, so that humans might form 
social relations with the natural beings with whom they share a common 
mentality, subjectivity and spirit, the material and social boundary between 
cultural and natural domains itself disappears, or at least becomes porous. 
The resulting inclusion of animals, plants and other natural entities in the 
human social and cultural domain now becomes, not merely an issue of 
ideal categories or cultural classification, but also and equally of material, 
social relations and activities. We thus arrive by a different route at another 
contradiction of the orthodox structuralist conception of the nature—
culture relation as a privative opposition of objective nature to subjective 
culture, which points to the possibility of a second way of answering the 
question, and thus a different escape route from the Late Structuralist 
impasse. This is the way that Descola calls the “domestication” of nature.
 The former answer is the way followed by perspectivism; the latter is 
the way followed by the revival of animism. These, in sum, are the paths out 
of the impasse of Lévi-Straussian structuralism that have been followed 
by his more restive intellectual followers: in the former case, Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro (from now on, EVC) and those he has inspired, and 
in the latter by Philippe Descola and others who have shared his ideas. 
In neither case do we see a complete break with structuralism. The 
concern with the nature-culture relationship remains central to both, but 
is transformed in different ways that involve consequential departures 
from the received Lévi-Straussian canon. The framing of cultural analysis 
in terms of the nature-culture relationship remains, but in each case the 
meaning of its terms has been transformed in ways that open up new lines 
of theoretical and ethnographic inquiry, while much of the Saussurean 
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and formal structuralist theory responsible for the Late Structuralist 
crisis is tacitly jettisoned. A critical understanding of the sources of the 
crisis, however, provides a useful basis for understanding the common 
features and differences of the new Animism and Perspectivism as the 
two principal theoretical offspring of structuralism, and how it is that both 
have converged upon the issues of body and “spirit”.
ANIMISM: NATURE AS UNIVERSAL PAN-SPIRITISM
 The revival of anthropological interest in animism, Tylor’s conception 
of the original form of religion, is primarily due to the work of Philippe 
Descola. Tylor’s concept was based on the idea that natural objects and 
beings, both animate and inanimate, possess spirits, conceived as consisting 
of mental faculties, affects and subjective consciousness, although not 
necessarily human-like personalities. Descola had noticed in his fieldwork 
that the Achuar formed adoptive relations of kinship with natural 
beings, including both plants and animals, considering them to have 
subjectivity, intelligence, affect and communicative abilities. Although 
humans participate in this pan-spiritism, spirit is not itself conceived as 
an intrinsically human or cultural entity, but rather as an innate product of 
natural powers possessed by all species, including humans, animals, plants 
and spirits of the dead. Subjectivity and mentality as constituted by these 
powers are rather believed to be universal natural attributes of all beings, 
and although they may be amenable to social and cultural relationships 
with humans, are not products of human culture. Rather, it is the possession 
of these powers by natural entities independently of human culture that 
makes possible communication with them by humans and the adoption of 
some of them by humans as members of human society, thus constituting 
them, in Descola’s terms, as elements of la nature domestique (Descola 
1994). The universality of spirit does not imply universal homogeneity, 
in the sense that all species of beings possess identical spirits, any more 
than the universality of bodiliness implies that the bodies of all species are 
the same. Rather, the heterogeneous bodily forms of different species of 
beings correspond to distinctive spiritual forms, in many cases represented 
by “master” spirit beings that embody the differential attributes of their 
species-being. “Nature” thus comprises a world of objective differences of 
bodily form associated with distinctive spirit forms, for which the generic 
subjective faculties of spirit serve as a universal common denominator.
 This is my interpretation of the ethnographic evidence, which differs 
in one critical respect from Descola’s. Descola considers spirit to be an 
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essentially human quality, so that the sharing of spirit by animals and 
plants comes down to a sharing of humanity. In his interpretation, it is 
this common humanity that makes possible the formation by humans of 
kinship relations with animals and plants. This does not seem to me to 
be a logically necessary conclusion, valid for all instances of animism in 
Amazonia, but Descola offers ethnographic evidence for it from his own 
Achuar research data and some other Amazonian societies.
 It is clear in any case that animism, as Descola conceives it, has no 
place for the nature-culture distinction conceived in structuralist fashion as 
a privative opposition between the domains of human culture and nature. 
Rather, Descola’s ethnographically based account of the interactions 
of (Achuar) humans and non-human beings of various kinds, many of 
whom enter into shared social relations, has the effect of transforming 
the nature-culture relation from a binary opposition of logically distinct, 
mutually exclusive categories presumed to correspond to discrete classes 
of beings to a social relationship (or not) between discrete natural and 
cultural beings, thus creating a shifting and permeable boundary between 
the natural, non-social world and a social domain understood to include 
both cultural humans and natural beings, where the latter are understood 
to be endowed with human spirit identities. Culture, in its fully developed 
form, thus remains conceived as a distinctive characteristic of human 
society, but that society, in Descola’s heterodox formulation, does not form 
a bounded cultural unit, since it may include relations with non-cultural, 
although spiritually human natural beings. This still leaves unanswered the 
questions of the source, form and content of this common spirit. These are 
issues that may be clarified by a further consideration of the relations of 
bodiliness, subjective identities and perspectives, which properly belong to 
a critical discussion of perspectivism.
PERSPECTIVISM:  NATURE AS 
ANTHROPOCENTRIC PAN-CULTURALISM
 Taking its inspiration at least as much from structuralism’s 
critical dialogue with Modernist humanism as from anthropological 
interpretations of Amazonian cultures, perspectivism has shaped itself 
through a radical polemic against tenets of Modernist Western thought 
from Descartes to Lévi-Strauss, as well as all received schools of cultural 
anthropology. EVC presents perspectivist ideas as features of Amazonian 
indigenous thought, but he develops his propositions not so much 
through ethnographically based description and analysis of Amazonian 
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cultures, as through a philosophical dialogue between ideal-typical 
formulations of Western Modernist ideas and correspondingly general 
representations of purportedly common Amazonian cultural ideas. This 
rhetorical approach serves a methodological purpose and has theoretical 
effects. The representation of  Western Modernist ideas employed in the 
cultural comparison as an integral, homogeneous system of highly abstract 
ideal type-concepts rhetorically serves to authorize the perspectivist 
representation of Amazonian ideas as an equally homogeneous system of 
abstract concepts comparable in generality and corresponding in thematic 
content and philosophical concerns with the Western system with which 
they are compared: in short, a philosophical system not dissimilar from 
Modern Western speculative idealism. The result is the misrepresentation 
and mistranslation of the form, content and meaning of the ideal 
categories and social  meanings of  many Amazonian cultural systems, 
not to mention some of the Western ideas drawn upon for comparison. 
There is furthermore a failure to recognize fundamental features of the 
construction and meaning of specific categories and propositions that 
differentiate the Amazonian categories in question from the Modernist 
ideas with which they are compared.  I agree with Lévi-Strauss, Viveiros 
de Castro and  other  perspectivists that there are important common ideas 
shared by many Amazonian systems (such as animism), but I also think 
that there is equally good ethnographic evidence for significant differences 
among the cultural constructions of different Amazonian societies, such 
as those societies possessing large, effectively endogamous villages with 
stratified systems of  social groupings, like the Gê and Bororo, and those 
with dispersed hamlets that are effectively exogamous and unstratified, like 
many Tupian, Cariban, Shuar, Achuar and some smaller Arawakan groups, 
with the Tukanoan and Arawakan societies of the northwest Amazon 
appearing to combine features of both. 
 These conceptual and structural differences among Amazonian 
societies, not to mention the differences among conflicting Western 
Modernist philosophical and ideological positions, which receive equally 
short shrift, have important implications for some of the theoretical points 
at issue. This is not merely a matter of thematic content, but of the form 
and construction of what are presented as corresponding or opposing 
categories in these comparisons. The supposed Amazonian notions 
presented as counterparts of the Modern Western notions of “nature” and 
“culture”, and the related categories of “humanity”, “spirit”, “habitus” and 
“form” are prime examples of this problem. I shall return to these points 
in a moment. The existence of such significant variations within both 
cultural systems points to the inadequacy of a purely idealist approach 
16
Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/tipiti/vol7/iss1/1
 The	Crisis	of	Late	Structuralism	 19
that is unable to account for them. This is not the place for a critique of 
the representations of Modern Western thought that serve as contrastive 
frames for perspectivist formulations of Amazonian concepts. For present 
purposes it will be better to go directly to the ethnographic and theoretical 
basis of perspectivist propositions about Amazonian ideas.
ANIMALS ARE HUMAN?
  The most radical and distinctive perspectivist claim for the uniqueness 
of Amazonian cosmologies and epistemological perspectives as contrasted 
with Western ideas (including received structuralist anthropological ideas 
about Amazonian cultures) is that Amazonians do not, after all, conceive 
nature, as represented by animals, and culture as mutually distinct and 
contrastive categories, in the manner of Lévi-Straussian structuralism. 
Rather, animals, as the supposed embodiments of nature, subjectively 
identify themselves as humans, and thus as cultural beings. Culture and 
humanity are not limited to humanity, but extend to encompass nature 
as well (at least animal nature: the extent to which plants and inanimate 
entities, so prominent in Tylor’s concept of animism, are included in EVC’s 
conception of cultural identity remains unclear). Subjectively speaking, 
animals are really human, albeit with different outward forms, which 
EVC dismisses as mere “envelopes” without significant connections to the 
subjective identity of the essential being within. Similarly, the material 
forms of activities are dissociated from their essential mental content from 
the perspective of the animals that perform them. Animals thus supposedly 
see themselves as engaging in the same cultural activities as humans even as 
the objective forms of their activities appear to humans as animalistic and 
uncultured. For example, jaguars, as they guzzle the blood of their victims, 
conceive themselves to be sipping fermented manioc beer, a typical cultural 
activity of some (though by no means all) human Amazonian societies.
 EVC derives this challenging revision of received structuralist and 
Modernist ideas from his reinterpretation of Amazonian myths and related 
ideas from a number of Amazonian peoples. The myths in question relate 
that before the development of human culture in its contemporary form, 
humans and animals coexisted on relatively undifferentiated terms, sharing 
language and, on the animals’ side, the prototypes of cultural implements 
such as cooking fire, bows and arrows, dwelling houses, ways of hunting, 
collecting and preparing food, and the spinning of cotton string. Animals 
and humans could assume each other’s forms, converse, and even in some 
cases marry. Each species nevertheless had its own characteristic bodily 
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form, essentially that which it has today, and humans were marginally 
cleverer than the animals (and meaner—they sometimes lied to the animals 
or played tricks on them). According to EVC, the animals identified 
themselves with humans and came to think of their behavior as cultural, 
and continue to do so until the present day.
 This last part of EVC’s interpretation, however, is not supported by 
the actual texts of the variants of the myth with which I am familiar.2 
According to these Gê and Bororo variants, ancestral humans did not yet 
possess culture in the mythical era when they and the animals coexisted. 
Rather, as I have mentioned, it was the animals rather than the ancestral 
humans who initially possessed prototypes of key cultural products. The 
humans had to steal or otherwise acquire these before they could learn to 
produce them and thus create culture in the full, contemporary sense. The 
human development of culture and the acts that led to it disrupted the 
Edenic coexistence of the ancestral humans and animals, and resulted in 
the loss by the animals of the proto-cultural possessions and skills they had 
had. Animals thus became fully differentiated from humans as completely 
natural beings, and humans correspondingly became fully differentiated 
from them as contemporary cultural humans.
 EVC’s interpretation of this myth (he seems to include the Gê and 
Bororo myths, which Lévi-Strauss takes as the point of departure of 
The Raw and the Cooked, among the “Amazonian myths” to which he 
refers) provides much of the foundation for the theoretical edifice of 
perspectivism. It proceeds from the assumption that the ancestral humans 
of the myth, those who cohabited as equals with the animals, were identical 
for all relevant purposes with contemporary humans: that is, that they were 
already cultural beings. This assumption is essential to his thesis that the 
animals of the mythical era, in identifying with their contemporaries, the 
ancestral humans, thereby identified themselves as beings with culture in 
the contemporary sense. EVC further interprets the myth as evidence that 
contemporary Amerindians believe that the descendants of the animals 
have continued to identity as human, cultural beings down to the present. 
 The main features of the mythical narrative (or at least the Gê and 
Bororo variants), however, contradict these assumptions. In them, both the 
humans and the animals of the mythical era are described as being more 
like each other than is the case of contemporary humans and animals. 
The myth tells how the contemporary forms of each became differentiated 
through a process in which the ancestral humans transformed themselves 
into modern humans through their invention of culture, while the ancestral 
forms of the animals became less like humans, losing their proto-cultural 
possessions, and thereby became totally natural beings like modern 
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animals, completely lacking cultural traits. The perspectivist interpretation 
of the myth, in short, gets it exactly wrong at least as far as this set of 
myths is concerned. The whole point of these myths is not how animals 
became and continue to be identified with humans, thus subverting the 
contrast between nature and culture, but how animals and humans became 
fully differentiated from each other, thus giving rise to the contemporary 
differentiation of nature and culture. Rather than recount how the mythical 
community of humans and animals resulted in a lasting identification 
of the latter with the former, the myths tell the opposite story of how 
the mutual differentiation of the species, and with it of their respective 
subjective identities and perspectives, actually came about as a corollary 
result of the one-sided possession of culture by humans.
 The perspectivist interpretation not only misconstrues the overt 
message of the Gê variants of the myth, but also rests upon other 
inferences that find no support in the mythical narrative. These inferences 
do not logically follow and appear to proceed from an unexamined 
anthropocentrism. To begin with, the myth’s account of the original state 
of relative undifferentiation between humans and animals does not include 
any explicit assertion that the animals subjectively identified themselves 
with humans. What the myths say is that animal and human identities, 
and thus also, in perspectivist terms, their perspectives, were relatively 
undifferentiated. Both possessed language and some other proto-cultural 
traits, but they both also possessed animal traits, such as devouring their 
meat raw. That the ancestral animals adopted some quasi-human traits no 
more implies that they thereby identified with the proto-humans than 
that the ancestral humans, by eating their meat raw, thereby identified 
themselves as animals.
 The implicit anthropocentrism of the perspectivist formulation 
appears more starkly in other propositions of perspectivist theory, such as 
those dealing with the “spirituality” of animals and participation in social 
relations with humans. EVC assumes these aspects of animal character 
and behavior must be the result of the animals’ identification with humans, 
on the grounds that “spirit” and the capacity for social relations are 
intrinsically human attributes. Neither Amerindian cultures in general, 
Amazonian cultures in particular, nor the myths in question, however, 
offer any support for this anthropocentric assumption. On the contrary, 
indigenous Amazonian myths, cosmology and ritual practice provide 
ample evidence for the opposite assumption, to wit that all entities, not 
only animals but plants and even some inanimate objects, possess spirits in 
their own right. It follows that they may have the capacity, if not necessarily 
the propensity, to enter into social relations with humans, but this does not 
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make them identify as humans. In this respect the ethnographic evidence 
is consistent with a non-anthropocentric version of animism rather than 
an anthropocentric perspectivism.
THE NATURE OF CULTURE 
AND THE RELATION OF CULTURE TO NATURE
  These critical reservations about perspectivism’s self-presentation as 
a revolutionary transformation of orthodox structuralist and Modernist 
conceptions of the nature-culture contrast and its claim to have identified 
the basic principle of Amazonian cosmologies serve to bring into sharper 
focus the continuities of perspectivism and structuralism in other 
essential respects. Perspectivism actually retains the orthodox structuralist 
conception of the relation of nature and culture as a privative binary 
opposition of mutually exclusive classificatory categories defined through 
the contrastive presence or absence of traits: thus culture is defined by the 
possession of distinctive features like language, cooking fire, manioc beer, 
etc., and nature, as the opposing category, is defined by the absence of these 
features. Closer attention to the ethnographic detail of the myths on which 
both structuralist and perspectivist notions of these categories are based, 
however, reveals that this way of thinking misunderstands indigenous 
conceptions of the nature of culture as well as the domain or condition of 
nature, and most importantly the ubiquity and role of mediations between 
the two such as those constituted by the prototypes of cultural items 
possessed by the ancestral animals in the myths).
 The myths do not represent the transition from the relatively 
undifferentiated coexistence of humans and animals to fully developed 
human culture and acultural animality as a simple process of the loss or 
acquisition of traits. They emphasize the importance of the possession of 
the proto-cultural possessions of the animals (the cooking fire, bow and 
arrows, manioc beer etc.) as a crucial transitional stage between the two. 
The essence of fully developed culture, as contrasted to the half-way house 
of the animals’ prototypes,  is rather described as the ability to produce these 
things, and most importantly, what this ability further implies, the reflexive 
ability to produce the process of producing them, as a generalized and infinitely 
replicable form of activity.
 What is involved here is not merely classification, or even a simple 
cognitive or perceptual process of objectification, but a reflexive process 
of meta-objectification, in an abstracted and generalized form: that is, of 
the process of objectification itself. This clearly requires a different level of 
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cognitive operations from that involved in the simple possession and use 
of individual objects, even those that may constitute prototypes of cultural 
artifacts. This is the difference, for example, between the one-piece cooking 
fire possessed by the jaguars in the Gê myths of the origin of cooking fire, 
and the use of a specimen piece of that fire to light other cooking fires at 
the climactic end of the myth (Turner 1985:87-96). The ancestral animals 
in the myths possess objects like cooking fire or beer or bows and arrows, 
but these are represented only as singular possessions, as if they were, as 
far as their animal owners are concerned, self-existing or self-objectifying 
things, or found objects that the animals appropriated but never made. 
The animals are nowhere described as having the cultural ability or power 
to produce or copy such things. When humans acquire them from the 
animals, by whatever means, the animals simply lose them. They cannot 
make others to replace them, because they cannot produce production.
 Culture comes fully into existence when the ancestral humans not 
only come into possession of these objects but become able to objectify and 
replicate the processes of objectification (in pragmatic terms, production) 
by which they are produced: how to use fire to make fire, how to ferment 
manioc to make manioc beer, or how to transform the surface forms of 
their bodies with painting or ornaments to produce or regulate in culturally 
standardized ways the internal bodily processes of transformation that give 
rise to aspects of social personhood.
 The products of such a process, whether material artifacts or conceptual 
objects of knowledge, cannot be understood as simple, internally 
homogeneous classes in a semiotic order of signification or ethnoscientific 
taxonomy, but as complex schemas composed of heterogeneous elements 
and levels of features, comprising transformational steps in a process of 
mediating relatively natural to relatively cultural forms (for example, from 
the appropriation of  “natural” entities such as fire or game animals, to the 
use of the fire to cook the flesh of the animals, and on to the use of the fire 
to cook itself, that is, to make fire). The cooked meat, as a representative 
cultural product, can be opposed in good structuralist fashion to raw meat as 
an instance of the binary contrast of culture to nature, but what has made it 
a cultural artifact is the transformative operations condensed within it, not 
merely the cooking but the lighting of the cooking fire. Culture is thus not 
opposed to nature as a simple, mutually exclusive binary contrast of semantic 
features, but rather consists of a complex, reflexive, transformative relation 
to it. This process both contains and overlies its basic natural components as 
a series of incremental levels in a hierarchy of transformational operations 
(schemas) of increasing generative (productive) power. Cultural things, in 
other words, are compounds of natural content (the meat, the physical body 
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of the social person) and the transformative activities through which it is 
objectified (i.e. transformed into) cultural forms. Culture, understood in 
these terms, neither excludes nor suppresses natural contents or qualities, 
but rather retains and reproduces them through the employment of more 
abstract and generalized meta-forms of the processes and powers that 
produce them.
  The emphasis of my discussion of the meaning of myths on the role 
of the serial transformations of symbolic elements like the cooking fire 
may recall the critique of Lévi-Strauss’s one-dimensional, synchronic 
conception of the signification of the semiological elements of myth 
offered in the introduction to this paper. An integral part of that critique 
was the recognition that the “fundamental structures” of culture and the 
mind that Lévi-Strauss hoped to reveal through the structural analysis of 
“groups” of myths should properly be sought at the level of the invariant 
principles governing the internal transformations comprising the structures 
of individual myths or  kinship systems. These transformations, of course, 
are not limited to the individual symbolic or semiotic elements of cultural 
constructs such as myths, but may involve more complex constructs such 
as tropes (Turner 1991, 2006) or episodes of mythical narratives (Turner 
1985). In the case at hand, I suggest that the progressive transformations 
of the cooking fire as the central theme of the mythical allegory of the 
emergence of culture from nature conform to the principle that the efficacy 
of transformational activities (such as cooking) varies directly as the power 
of those activities to produce (and thus transform) themselves. Production, 
considered as a self-objectifying and self-transformative activity, is thus of 
the essence of culture and its differentiation from nature.
 This relatively sophisticated conception of the relation of nature and 
culture as a transformational process rather than a synchronic, practico-inert 
semiological contrast is clearly formulated in the Gê and Bororo myths, but 
is rendered invisible by structuralist analysis like that of Lévi-Strauss in The 
Raw and the Cooked, with its conceptual filter of Saussurean semiotics that 
blocks recognition of the cultural significance of the activities by which 
the objects and categories in question are produced. This is a fundamental 
point of disagreement between the Amazonian myths, as interpreted 
here, and perspectivism, given EVC’s assertion that production is not a 
transformational process, leaving only exchange as a truly transformational 
activity capable of inducing the transformation of perspectives. On this 
critical point EVC shows himself an orthodox structuralist, following 
Lévi-Strauss’s lead in The Elementary Structures of Kinship and other early 
writings on kinship. In these writings Lévi-Strauss uses exchange theory, 
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grounded in the “fundamental structure” of reciprocity, as the basis of 
his analysis of kinship, begging the question of how to account for the 
existence of the exchangers (the groups of men who supposedly gave rise 
to human culture by exchanging women, not to mention the men and 
women themselves). In sum: the transformations of productive activity, 
which include exchange as one of their mediating moments, are, according 
to the myths of at least one numerous and important group of indigenous 
Amazonian peoples, the principle mediators of the relation of nature to 
culture, and directly construct the pragmatic and conceptual structures 
of culture itself. Perspectivism’s failure to theorize the role of productive 
transformations in cultural structures is a major lacuna in its conception of 
perspectives. It leads to its failure to recognize the reflexive operations of 
objectification and meta-objectification which the myths represent as the 
distinctive properties of culture for what they are: the most powerful and 
important perspectives of all.
“MULTINATURALISM”: DIFFERENT WORLDS OR 
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES?
 Perspectivism’s focus on Amazonian concepts of the self (for 
perspectivism this essentially means the epistemological subject rather than 
the agent of praxis) constitutes a salutary departure from structuralism’s 
one-sidedly objectivist theoretical perspective, and its disinterest in the 
role of subjective perspectives in the formation of cultural and semiotic 
representations, including cosmologies. The one-sided subjectivism of 
perspectivism would seem to qualify it as a form of relativism: if different 
subjects see the world differently, it might be because they have different 
subjective points of view, or different ways of seeing the world. EVC, 
however, rejects this view of perspectivism as relativism, on the grounds 
that Amazonians (and indeed, at several points in his argument, all 
Amerindians) think that although animals, from their identical perspectives 
as humans, see the world in the same way, they arrive at different ideas of it 
because they see different worlds (this is what he calls “multinaturalism”).
 To understand what is at issue here one must start by asking what the 
differences are among the “worlds” that the animals supposedly see. The 
answer given by EVC is: the animal identity of the different species of 
animals, as seen by animal subjects of each species who identify themselves 
to themselves as humans. Every species is seen by every other as an animal 
but sees itself as a human (i.e., cultural) being. For every species, therefore, 
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the boundary between nature and culture is differently drawn. Each species 
thus sees a different “nature” than all the others. One may ask in what 
way this differs from the conventional “naturalist” idea that each species of 
animal recognizes its own kind and sees all other species as different kinds 
of animal from itself. The answer is that the only difference appears to be 
the assumption that each animal continues to identify itself as a human 
and thus a citizen in good standing of the domain of culture, in contrast 
to all the other animals. We may note in passing that this seems to leave 
the form of the conceptual opposition of nature and culture intact as far 
as its logical structure is concerned. Only its content is treated as variable 
(“multiple”), and this only in virtue of the psychological principle of the 
egocentricity of animal perspectives. The form of the worlds seen by all 
species remains the same.
 An additional problematic consequence of EVC’s idea of 
multinaturalism is that having committed himself to the thesis that all 
animals see themselves as humans, it becomes necessary for him to maintain 
that the visible bodies of the different species (animals can of course see 
their own bodies, or parts of them, as well as those of other animals) have 
nothing to do with their inner subjective identities as humans. As he 
writes:
Manifest bodily form of each species is an “envelope” (a “clothing”) that 
conceals an internal humanoid form… this internal form is the soul or spirit 
of the animal: an intentionality or subjectivity formally identical to human 
consciousness. (Viveiros de Castro 2004:465) 
 Inner subjective identities, however, are invisible to other animals (and 
humans). Animals of different species therefore must see one another 
as animals rather than as they see themselves (with their minds’ eyes) as 
humans. But on what basis do they “see” the animal natures of these other 
species? The manifest form of the physical body has already been ruled 
out as a mere “clothing” irrelevant to essential species identity. How then 
to find a way of recognizing the significance of physical bodiliness to the 
perspectival animal identities of other animal species? EVC deals with this 
question as follows: 
Animals perceive differences among species of animals not on the basis of 
physiological differences—Amerindians recognize a basic uniformity of 
bodies—but rather [of ] affects, in the old sense of dispositions or capacities 
that render the body of each species unique… the body is in this sense an 
assemblage of affects or ways of being that constitute a habitus… and the 
body is the origin of perspectives. (Viveiros de Castro 2004:475) 
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 I don’t understand what EVC means by his claim that “Amerindians 
recognize a basic uniformity of bodies” (not so in any relevant sense, in my 
limited experience), nor what relevance the assertion that “animals do not 
perceive physiological differences among species” is meant to have to his 
claim about how “Amerindians” see the world (my italics).  I do, however, 
have some other questions about EVC’s use of the concept of habitus, 
and its place in his complex argument for the relevance of bodily form to 
subjective identity, spirit and perspective.
 As a distinctive mode of affective orientation and behavioral disposition 
toward the world, the habitus constitutes a pragmatic form of perspective 
on it. In so many words, it constitutes part of an animal’s differential 
perspective on the world, and thus the “different world” it sees. In sum, the 
habitus must be the aspect of the body that is the “origin” of perspectives, 
and as such conditions the specific “nature” seen by the species, quite apart 
from its putative inner subjective identity as human, which is supposedly 
unrelated to its bodily form, although in other connections that is the 
aspect of animal being that EVC claims is the basis of its perspective 
(indeed, the basis of “perspectivism” as a theory).
 The concept of habitus is critical for EVC because it does not purport 
to point inward to the subjective identity of the animal, but outward to 
its behavior and interaction with the world. EVC defines the concept as 
affective rather than cognitive (in contrast to other theorists like Mauss or 
Bourdieu who employed the concept to denote both cognitive and affective 
modes of subjective perspective), and as composed of the specifically bestial 
behaviors of the species. It thus, by virtue of this idiosyncratic definition, 
becomes identified as the “natural” aspect of species identity, in contrast to 
the cognitive, cultural human aspect comprising its inner subjectivity. In 
effect, the reformulation of the concept of habitus becomes the indispensable 
basis for the reimportation of the structuralist opposition of nature and 
culture as the frame of EVC’s concept of animal identity, in a way that 
leaves the cultural (spiritual, human) component intact and insulated from 
the bestial, natural bodily aspect of the creature. The fundamental principle 
at issue here is the mutual dissociation and irrelevance of external bodily 
(natural, affective) form and internal spiritual (cultural, cognitive) content.
 It is no doubt in order to highlight the distinctive role of habitus in this 
respect that EVC asserts that “Amerindians recognize a basic uniformity 
of bodies”, which if taken literally would mean that they do not perceive 
or cognitively “recognize” bodily differences among animals, which if 
true would indeed seem to leave affective habitus as the animals’ only 
visibly differentiable property. Apart from the question of what evidence 
could possibly be found for such an assertion, the attempt to restrict the 
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meaning of habitus to affective dispositions seems untenable, and as soon 
as a cognitive dimension is admitted, the use of the concept in EVC’s 
argument becomes contradictory. As a specific mode of material activity, 
the habitus of a species must obviously take into account the physical 
shape, size and capacities of the species’ physical bodily form. It must thus 
constitute the framework, not only of an integral subjective (affective, but 
also cognitive) perspective on the world for the animal in question, but also 
of the objective identity of each species as it is perceived by other species. 
It therefore appears to stand in contradiction of the putative conceptual 
“uniformity” of their bodies, as well as the dissociation of bodily features 
and appearance as mere “clothing” from aspects of the character (affective 
disposition, typical  modes of behavior, etc.) if not the inner spiritual 
identity of the species.
MULTINATURALISM AS “TYPE” AND “BOMB”
 “Multinaturalism”, as I have suggested above, rests squarely upon 
the foundation of the familiar structuralist contrast between a general, 
and at the most abstract level, unitary, category of culture and an equally 
generic, abstractly unitary category of nature. Both categories can be, and 
routinely are, employed at less abstract and general levels to apply to the 
varieties of specific cultures and natural species, respectively giving rise to 
multiculturalism and multinaturalism. These are simply analogous moves 
within a taxonomic hierarchy consisting of different levels of generality 
and more or less ample provision for differing subjective perspectives, not 
whole opposing philosophies, as EVC argues. In the same way, “naturalism” 
and “multinaturalism”, which EVC represents as contradictory theoretical 
perspectives, the former being that of outmoded, pre-perspectivist 
Modernism and the latter the perspectivist view that is now supplanting it, 
are more accurately if simply understood as tags for foci on different levels 
of the same conceptual hierarchy. “Naturalism” does not imply a denial 
of differences among species any more than “multinaturalism” entails 
a rejection of common natural (biological) animal properties shared to 
varying degrees by all of them. It differs from “multinaturalism” in taking 
seriously the positive relationships between bodily features, habitus and 
the inner character and perspectives of natural creatures, but in this I 
believe it is closer to the thinking of most if not all Amazonian Indians 
than perspectivist “multinaturalism”.
 “Multinaturalism” in any case does not logically supplant the nature-
culture distinction shared by most varieties of Modernism, including 
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structuralism and anthropology, which EVC collectively terms “naturalism”, 
as he claims. Rather, multinaturalism continues to presuppose it as the 
common form of the contrast between the habituses of all the different 
animal species and the human (cultural) identity that constitutes their 
“formal subjectivity”. For EVC, as I have described in the preceding section, 
the psychic and bodily structure of each species constitutes a logically 
identical microcosm of the privative contrast between spiritual, human, 
cultural identity and a bodily, bestial, affective, natural perspective. Thus 
the binary nature-culture opposition that had supposedly been shattered 
and transcended by the concept of multinaturalism returns as the formal 
framework of a potentially infinite number of cases, like the many little 
brooms that arise from the shattered broomstick in Disney’s film of “The 
Sorcerer’s Apprentice” in “Fantasia”.
 This metaphorical interpretation of the implications of multinaturalism 
for the human and natural sciences may be contrasted with EVC’s claim 
(as reported by Bruno Latour in his  deliriously enthusiastic account of 
the public “disputatio” between EVC and Descola held in Paris in January 
2009) that perspectivism and multinaturalism constitute:
[A] bomb with the potential to explode the whole implicit philosophy 
so dominant in most ethnographers’ interpretation of their material… 
[Multinaturalism is] a much more troublesome concept [than perspectivism]… 
Whereas hard and soft scientists alike agree on the notion that there is only 
one nature but many cultures, Viveiros wants to push Amazonian thought… 
to try to see what the whole world would look like if all its inhabitants had 
the same culture but many different natures. (Latour 2009:2; cf. Descola and 
Viveiros de Castro 2009)
This, according to Latour, is the essence of EVC’s conception of “the 
Amerindian struggle against Western philosophy”, spearheaded by the 
concepts of perspectivism and multinaturalism, which he accuses Descola 
of trying to reduce to “just another curio in the vast cabinet of curiosities 
that he [Descola] is seeking to build” (Latour 2009:2).
 “‘Pushing’ Amazonian thought” into propositions patently alien to it 
(Amazonian peoples are keenly aware of, and interested in, the differences 
among their own cultures, let alone those of the non-indigenous peoples 
with whom they have come into contact, and would be the first to find the 
idea of a mono-cultural world absurd) may be a fascinating speculative 
exercise for non-indigenous intellectuals, but it has left anthropology far 
behind to take a place all its own as a “curio in the vast cabinet of curiosities” 
of perspectivist philosophy.
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THE BODY AS THE “ORIGIN OF PERSPECTIVES”: 
BUT WHAT BODY (-IES)?
 These difficulties at least have the merit of focusing attention on the 
centrality of the idea of the body as the “origin of perspectives”. This idea of 
the relation of bodiliness and perspectives actually contains several issues 
of critical importance to the anthropology of Amazonian cultures.
 The first is that of precisely what is meant by “the body”: the physical 
body to be sure, but there is also a social body, which is something else 
again. The physical body itself is a complex entity that is not at all moments 
of its existence an individual entity. It originates as a union between two 
physical bodies of opposite sexes, is born as cultureless being more animal 
than human, acquires cultural personhood, then dies and is transformed 
into a spirit which becomes an animal-like being again who terrifies his 
or her surviving relatives by seeking to kill them so that they could join 
him or her in the spirit world (this at any rate is the Kayapo idea). The 
body, in short, even as a physical entity, is not an abstract object with a 
fixed, culturally human perspective, but a process comprising a series of 
transformations, each of which entails a transformation of perspectives, 
not all of which are cultural: in the Kayapo view, at least, we start and finish 
as animals.
 As noted, however, there is also a social body. This is a polymorphous, 
androgynous entity, defined as a conjunction of relations among all the 
relevant social types of bodily identities constructed of contrastive values 
on shared dimensions like gender and social age, which formulate the 
signification of each bodily type through their contrastive relations to the 
other types that form part of the same system (e.g., bachelor youth, married 
woman, elder man and/or woman). The relationally defined identities of 
social bodiliness define perspectival relations of each embodied person to 
other bodily identities that form part of the same system. It is this system 
of contrastive values as a whole, comprising every socially marked stage of 
bodily development of both genders, from before birth to after death, that 
constitutes the external relational form of the social body (Turner 1995).
 There is also, however, an internal composition of the social body, made 
up of the bodily senses, powers and processes that together comprise the 
socially relevant content of the externally related gendered and generational 
categories of bodily form. In some Amazonian societies, different senses, 
for example, are considered not only as of varying importance but also as 
the channels of different modes of knowledge. As Santos Granero has 
noted, the Kayapo associate hearing (/-mari/) with knowing, but it is a 
specific kind of knowing, passive understanding as contrasted with the 
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active knowledge of how to do things, which is more associated with sight 
(/-omun/) (cf. Santos Granero 2006:72; Turner 1980, 1995). Vocalization 
(speech and singing), though not a sensory faculty, is associated with the 
system of senses and modes of knowledge, since speech is the channel of the 
knowledge that must be internalized through the auditory channel. Smell 
is not much emphasized by the Kayapo, but as Santos Granero reports it 
is a culturally emphasized source of knowledge among the Yanesha, who 
however consider hearing the most important sense, followed by seeing, 
with smell in third place; C. Crocker reports that among the Bororo smell 
is the faculty through which the presence of a class of spirits, the Bope, 
and the presence of the dead and the giant water spirits who take part in 
mortuary and initiation rites are perceived (Santos Granero 2006:72,73,77; 
Crocker 1985). The point for present purposes is that for the Kayapo 
and many other Amazonian peoples, these differentiated sensory modes 
of knowledge are also integrally identified with distinct categories and 
aspects of social identity that are culturally marked by specific forms of 
bodily adornment (ear plugs, lip plugs, body painting in different age- and 
gender-related styles, etc.) (Turner 1980, 1995). The same can be said for 
stages of physical growth, the development of sexuality and reproductive 
powers, and for a man, whether or not he has acquired power by killing an 
enemy.
 Taken together, all of these internal bodily powers, sensory forms 
of knowledge, and stages of growth, culturally marked by modifications 
of the surface of the body, collectively constitute a template or filter for 
the channeling, regulation and selective suppression of internal bodily 
powers, energies, sensory capacities and modes of knowledge as well as the 
contents of the external relational categories, identities and perspectives 
that I have called the social body (Turner 1980, 1995). It is this system 
of external and internal articulations of the social body, as articulated by 
the culturally stylized decoration of the form of the body’s surface (skin, 
coiffure, items of costume and adornment) that in indigenous Amazonian 
societies shapes and defines the social meaning of the physical body to 
its social and natural environment. It is this complex entity, comprised of 
the physiological body as mediated by the social body, then, that is “the 
origin of perspectives”. Rather than identify this point of origin with the 
physical body in opposition to the social identity and cultural subjectivity 
of the person, which seems to be EVC’s point, in sum, I would argue 
the contrary, which is that the synthetic social and physical body is the 
origin of perspectives precisely because it is the formal (culturally defined) 
subjective identity of the person.
 A second major issue has already been mentioned in passing, which is the 
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mutable nature of perspectives considered as moments of transformational 
social and natural processes (as distinct from their abstract ideal character 
as attributes of semiotic or cultural classification). EVC appears to conceive 
of perspectives as fixed aspects of species identities, which are essentially 
like synchronic signifieds in Saussurean fields of signification abstracted 
from discourse, social uses and processes. For perspectivism, the class as 
an ideal identity thus becomes the subject position that functions as the 
real “origin of perspectives” (as I have pointed out above, this does seem 
awkward for EVC’s contention that animals’ subjective identity as humans 
is unconnected with their bodies, which are supposedly the origin of all 
perspectives). There is thus for perspectivists only one, fixed perspective per 
species-class, or even per super-class of species (e.g., all species of animals, 
who collectively have the identities and thus the perspectives of humans, if 
only on themselves). Against this I would argue that perspectives, rooted 
as they are in the synthetic social and physical body, are for that reason 
also integrally connected with the social relations of that body to other 
social and physical (cultural and natural) bodies. These compound entities 
and relations go through developmental processes and therefore undergo 
regular transformations at several levels. For individuals, there are the 
developmental transformations of social age and status that comprise the 
life cycle. These are in turn bound up with the transformations of family 
relations and role-identities that constitute the developmental cycles of the 
family and domestic group, which produce sui generis transformations of 
subjective perspectives of the members of these social units.
 These transformations remain within the generic class of human social 
relations and perspectives as contrasted to natural (animal, plant, etc.) ones. 
One can thus speak of hierarchies of perspectives, comprising the overall 
common perspective of members of the class as they go through successive 
transformations of their species- or class-identities. I have referred to 
collectively standardized transformations such as those that constitute the 
normative patterns of the life cycle or family cycle, but as Rosengren and 
also Pedersen have emphasized, there are idiosyncratic individual identities 
and perspectives that also go through transformations below the level of 
any collective social pattern. These may coexist with collective institutional 
patterns as I have described or they may not, as in the cases discussed by 
Rosengren (Pedersen 2007; Rosengren 2009).
 Some transformations may produce changes in the generic human or 
animal subjective or spirit-identities of an individual. For the Kayapo, as 
I have noted above, the human life cycle does not end with death, but 
continues through a transformative period of separation of the spirit from 
the decomposing body, after which the disembodied spirit loses its human 
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identity and becomes “transformed into an animal” in the metaphorical 
language of Kayapo keening for the dead. At this point, therefore, the 
basic species identity itself and the human perspective that goes with it 
are lost and the ghostly spirit assumes the perspective and identity of an 
animal. It should be emphasized that such perspectival inversions and 
transformations are not the result of “predation” or the “cannibal cogito” as 
adduced by perspectivist theory to account for ambiguous instances of the 
juxtaposition of contradictory aspects or elements, as Wright has pointed 
out in an analogous context (Wright 2009:151-152).
FORM AND CONTENT, BODY AND “SOCIAL SKIN”, 
SCHEMA AND SPIRIT
 The third major issue associated with bodiliness is the complex matter 
of the relation of external bodily form to inner subjective identity, a common 
concern of Amazonian cosmologies and concepts of subjectivity alike. It 
can be argued (and has been so argued by EVC) that for many Amazonian 
peoples, the physiological body is considered a mere “envelope” of the spirit 
or subjective consciousness: external physical form, in so many words, does 
not determine inner subjective content. In speaking of bodily form and its 
relation to subjective identity, spirit or perspective, however, it is essential 
to distinguish between the form of the physical body as a property of the 
species and the meta-form of the social body constructed by adornment 
and modifications such as coiffure, painting and clothing that together 
constitute what I have called a “social skin” (Turner 1980).
 As a general ethnographic point, the universal practice of Amazonian 
cultures in altering the external form of the body through changes in 
adornment, painting, coiffure, dress and scarification, to mark and help 
to bring about transformations in the social identity and subjective 
perspective of persons, is inconsistent with assertions that the Amerindian 
peoples of Amazonia regard bodily form as modified by this “social skin” 
merely as an external “envelope” unrelated to the inner material and 
spiritual content of subjective identity and/or personhood. The critical 
point is that the deliberate adornment of the surface of the body is for 
Amazonians a means of defining and regulating the identity and social 
relations of the person. The importance of this practice arises from the idea 
that subjectivity or spirit is to an important degree the product of a person’s 
social relations. More precisely, it is the product of an interaction between 
the inner powers and senses of the body, and the modes of knowledge 
and capacities for growth and activity they make possible, and the external 
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world of social relations and activities. The natural form of the unadorned 
body is a tabula rasa across which the interchange between the internal 
content of bodily powers and senses and the external social world that is 
mediated by the meta-surface of the “social skin” takes place. In this sense 
the physical body considered as surface form could be called an “envelope” 
that does not determine the inner character of the spirit or subject, while 
cultural forms of bodily decoration take over the role of imposing definite 
perspectival form on both the inner subjective identity and external objects 
of interaction of the embodied person.
ANIMISM AS UNIVERSAL NATURAL 
SPIRITUAL PERSPECTIVE
  Many if not all Amazonian cosmological systems are founded on the 
principle that the forms of things immanently contain the agency or power 
to produce themselves, through the transformation of their own contents. 
The forms of things, in other words, are actually embodied processes of 
formation, or the potential capacity and templates for them. They contain 
the agency or force that impels the content of things to assume the specific 
characteristics and behavioral patterns proper to their species or kind. 
This proposition holds, in principle, for the cosmos as a whole and all its 
constituent units, including humans and their social groupings, animals 
and plants, spirits of the dead and non-living beings such as celestial 
bodies like the sun and moon. In practice, it applies primarily to humans 
and higher animals, birds and fish, but it also holds in principle for the 
forms of lower animals, plants and major celestial bodies. It is intuitively 
most directly applicable to beings which undergo developmental processes, 
and thus most obviously partake of the dynamic quality of formation.
 The forms of things, in this view, are the guiding patterns of purposive 
activity that cause their objective physical contents to take on the form 
in question. They embody in this sense the spiritual force or subjective 
agency of the entity, that which makes it what it is. In the case of animate 
beings, their objective forms are thus conceived to be the products or 
manifestations of a subjective power of intentional action. An example of 
this is the Kayapo term /karon/ which is used equally to mean “image”, 
“form”, “shadow” or the “spirit”, soul, or ghost of a person or other entity. 
Although humans are thought of as the spirit- (/karon/) possessing beings 
par excellence, mammals, birds, fish and many trees, vines and other plants 
are also thought to possess spirit-forms and associated subjective powers.
 Here we rejoin the basic notion behind the “animism” common to most 
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if not all indigenous peoples of the Amazon (Bird-David 1999; Descola 
1996, 2005). Animism, in other words, is grounded in the idea that spirit 
is essentially the guiding principle, animating force, and intentional goal 
of the bodily process by which it is produced. The synthesis of form (or 
spirit) and content (or body) that constitutes a natural entity—a living 
being or inanimate natural entity like the cosmos or celestial bodies, in 
this view, can only be created and maintained by the exercise of the agency 
or power immanent in the form in question. The spirit of the entity is 
the form considered as an image or pattern that needs material content 
to exist. It is this need which becomes the force holding the form and 
content of the entity together. This unity is variable in strength, unstable, 
and susceptible to disruption and eventual dissolution as the subject loses 
its energy and power. Such dissolution can be either temporary, as in 
illness or shock induced by extreme fright, or permanent, as in the death 
of the person or organism. The spiritual force or formative aspect of the 
entity may thus under extreme conditions become separated from the 
bodily or material content of its form, but neither spirit nor body can exist 
independently for long without the other. Death brings the permanent 
separation of spirit-form from body-content, and thus dissolves the 
synthesis of form and content that is the basis of the objective existence of 
the organism. The fission of the synthetic unity of spirit and body results 
in the further decomposition and ultimate disappearance of its separated 
parts. The /karon/ or spirit-form continues to live on after the death of 
the body as a ghost, but gradually loses its human character, becoming an 
animal-like being in the forest and eventually dissolving completely. The 
material content (/in/, flesh or body) undergoes a parallel transformational 
process from living body to mass of dead (/tuk/, “black”, “dead”, or “in 
transformation”) rotting flesh, finishing as a disarticulated jumble of white 
bones.
BODILINESS, SPIRIT AND THE 
HUMAN DIMENSION OF ANIMISM
 The Kayapo think of their own bodies as hybrid combinations of 
natural animal qualities of form and content, supplemented by acquired 
formal attributes of social identity. The former are exemplified by internal 
physical processes located primarily in the central trunk of the body, such 
as growth, digestion, sexuality and reproduction. These natural energies 
and powers become transformed and directed into socially patterned 
activities of various kinds that are associated with transformations of 
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bodily form, including the natural processes of growth, aging, and puberty, 
and the cultural modifications of the surface of the body such as painting, 
hair-styling, and the wearing of ornaments. These modifications of surface 
form serve as a two-way filter that gives specific social meaning to relations 
between the embodied person and external entities with whom he/she 
interacts.
 “Nature”, in other words, is an integral component of human social 
bodies and thus of social persons. Natural forces and aspects of being 
(things that exist of themselves independently of human social activity) 
thus constitute essential components of central sites of social space-time 
and “culture”, as well as the peripheral natural zones of forest and savanna. 
The structure of human society, in sum, like human beings as individual 
embodied persons, incorporates fundamental “natural” forms of space-
time, agency, and powers, including those inherent in the animal content 
of human bodiliness and reproductivity. Human beings, moreover, undergo 
transformations to and from animal forms of being and identity in the 
course of their life and death cycles: fetuses in the womb and newborn 
babies are thought of as animal-like beings with special affinities and 
vulnerabilities to influences from animals and ghosts. The latter are likewise 
considered to lose their identities as humans and to end their existence 
as animal forms (they are addressed as having transformed themselves 
into animals in mortuary chanting and keening).  Human culture is thus 
conceived more as an incremental transformation of these natural elements, 
a “super-nature”, as it were, than a qualitatively distinct order of existence 
contrasted to “nature” in a mutually exclusive binary contrast with an 
excluded middle. The essence of this cultural increment is the application 
of natural transformational processes (such as fire) to themselves (as in the 
use of fire to make fire), thus generalizing and replicating what in nature 
remain relatively isolated processes.
 As beings with specific forms and spirit-identities shared with the 
other members of their species, humans and animals are similarly occupied 
with the form-giving, spirit-directed processes of growing, aging and dying, 
producing and reproducing, objectifying and de-objectifying themselves. 
The generic forms and contents of these processes consist of functional 
activities (i.e., hunting, foraging, eating, drinking, finding shelter, mating 
and reproducing) which are essentially identical for all embodied spirit-
beings regardless of the particular differences in their forms and contents. 
Beings of different species can thus identify their concretely different 
activities on the basis of their functional equivalence from the perspective 
of their common engagement in sustaining their bodies and spirit-forms. 
Plants also engage in analogous processes, but in many Amazonian cases 
34
Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/tipiti/vol7/iss1/1
 The	Crisis	of	Late	Structuralism	 37
they are not conceived to do so as individual organisms but rather as 
instances of collective entities, which embody the spirit of their species.
 An anteater lunching on an ant hill and a human lunching on a 
sandwich can thus regard themselves as engaged in the same functional 
activity, lunching. The human might express this sense of equivalence 
metaphorically by saying that the anteater is eating his sandwich, and the 
anteater might express the same perception by thinking of the human as 
licking up his ants. In terms of their shared perspective as form-guided, 
content-sustaining entities, there is no basis for privileging the human’s 
over the anteater’s way of expressing the functional identity of their 
activities.
 In a similar vein, the Kayapo think of other species as having their own 
forms of such human artifacts or activities as houses, songs and ceremonies, 
and even for some purposes (such as shamanic communication) language, 
although they clearly recognize that the actual forms taken by these 
activities are very different from their human equivalents. The belief in a 
generic identity of spirit, and the consequent equivalence of functionally 
identical activities, does not imply that either humans or animals make 
no distinctions between the specific differences between the forms of 
animal and human spirits or activities, or that they imagine that animals 
identify themselves as humans “under the skin”. It does mean, however, 
that all living beings, and some non-living ones, are engaged in processes 
of forming, sustaining and eventually losing their synthetic unities of 
form and content. The intentional orientation, forms of consciousness 
and energetic force that drives these processes constitute what we, and the 
indigenous peoples of Amazonia, call their spirits.
CONCLUSIONS
  Structuralism as a theoretical and ethnographic quest has passed 
through successive stages of construction, expansion and dissolution. Like 
its subject matter, the myths, kinship systems, bodies and persons of the 
indigenous societies of the Amazon and more broadly the Americas, it 
can be seen to have developed through a series of transformations, each 
affording distinct perspectives, but all constrained to remain within the 
invariant limitations of its own theoretical shortcomings. Chief among 
these was its failure to grasp the proper application of its eponymous 
concept, structure, to its own research data, and thus to realize its potential 
as an anthropological project. Its failures, however, have been instructive. 
Like a giant star that has burned up its internal sources of energy, in 
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its terminal implosion it has been sending out dazzling flares rich with 
material for new planetary systems. These new systems, the dissident 
successor movements it has inspired, above all perspectivism and the new 
work on animism, have raised new issues of importance to the field and 
stimulated fresh discussion, of which  the present paper is but one of many 
examples.
 At the beginning of the paper, I suggested that the basic problem of 
structuralism was that it started with the right idea but applied it to the 
wrong level of the data. My critiques of perspectivism and to a lesser extent 
animism have in several cases taken the form of suggestions of how the 
original structuralist notion of structure (the group of transformations 
constrained by invariant principles of conservation) could be applied 
to the data in question in a way that would strengthen the theoretical 
formulations of perspectivism and/or animism. In the case of the body 
and its avatar, the subject, for example, I argued that the perspectivist 
notion of the body as the origin of  perspectives, where both the body and 
its associated perspective are conceived as singular, unchanging entities, 
should be substituted by a conception of both bodies and perspectives 
understood as sequences of multiple transformations (thus potentially 
constituting groups of transformations bounded by one or more principles 
of conservation as called for in the structuralist model). I further suggested, 
as a qualification of different aspects of both perspectivist and animist 
ideas, that the perspectives and bodily conditions in question transform 
themselves from “natural” (the condition of embryos and infants) to 
“cultural” and ultimately back to “natural” with the onset of the dissolution 
of human form in aging, death and post-mortem ghostly existence. 
Extending my dialogue with animism, I urged that conceiving the body in 
appropriate structuralist terms as such a series of transformations opens a 
perspective on bodiliness as a process of interaction of the physical body, 
social body and person, stimulated and guided by relations with other 
embodied actors filtered and regulated by formal treatments of their bodily 
surfaces (“social skins”). This process of producing subjective perspective 
and objectified bodily form, drawing upon the natural bodily content of 
senses and powers, goes through a series of stages but it ultimately enters a 
terminal stage of deobjectification as the natural content of bodily powers 
weakens to the point where it cannot sustain its integration within the 
frame of personal identity and social form. The dissolution of form and 
content continues through the physical dissolution of death and the 
separate disintegration of spirit and body.
 For the Kayapo and other indigenous Amazonian peoples with 
whom I am somewhat familiar, this dialectical process of production and 
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dissolution, objectification and deobjectification, the embodiment and 
ultimate disembodiment of subjective intention and identity, manifested 
and articulated through the integration and disintegration of form and 
content, is the essence of the material and spiritual existence of the 
animate and inanimate beings that constitute their life world. It is in 
no way unique to cultural humans but is, rather, common to all natural 
entities. It can be understood as a broadly “animist” perspective, but gives 
no justification for the anthropocentric bias of some animist discussions of 
“spirit” as an essentially human attribute. This is also an important point for 
perspectivism: the mere possession of a spirit or subjectivity does not in and 
of itself indicate that an animal or plant therefore identifies itself as human 
(as it would if spirit and subjectivity were intrinsically human qualities). It 
is true that some, though certainly not all Amazonian cultures consider at 
least some animals to identify themselves subjectively as humans in some 
respects, but this should not be understood as following necessarily from 
their possession of their own spirits. There are many cases of beliefs that 
animals and plants (or their collective species-spirits, the “masters” of the 
game or plant species, etc.) possess spirits that owe nothing to human 
contacts or culture.
 I have argued that closer attention to the detailed structure of 
indigenous conceptions, both of natural beings and human embodied 
persons, is essential to avoid the distortions inherent in attempts to treat 
all Amazonian (or even all Amerindian) cultures as a single, homogeneous 
philosophical system. Dismissing the importance of divergent or even 
contradictory formulations of the same points on the part of societies 
of different types precludes the most useful anthropological method for 
understanding the social and cultural basis for such agreements as do exist.
 The critique of structuralist, animist and perspectivist theories I 
have offered in this paper has served as the context for reformulating the 
concept of structure as a series or group of transformations internal to 
the developmental process of entities, ranging from individual symbols or 
tropes to bodies and spiritual identities. I have attempted to show that 
this way of conceiving structure can serve to integrate Marxian concepts 
of productive praxis as well as interpretationist and semiotic approaches 
with the valuable contributions of Lévi-Straussian structuralism and its 
more recent epigones. Most importantly, I have sought to suggest how the 
hybrid, post-post-structuralist theoretical amalgam I have outlined may 
contribute to understanding some of the features of Amazonian cultures 
that have been brought to light through the ethnographic and theoretical 
work so powerfully stimulated by the debates of Late Structuralism.
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NOTES
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1.  For a fuller discussion of the limitations of structuralism, including its 
failure to produce viable structural analyses consistent with Lévi-Strauss’s own 
definition of structure, becoming in effect itself a form of post-structuralism avant 
l ’heure, see Turner 1990 “Structure and Entropy: Theoretical pastiche and the 
contradictions of ‘structuralism’.” Current Anthropology 31(5):563-568.
2.  See, for example, the following myths reproduced in J. Wilbert, Ed., Folk 
literature of the Gê Indians (1978), listed by number and page: 57(160), 58(164), 
59(166), 62(177), 63(181), 64(184), 65(190), 66(191), 90(242), 93(247), 94(248), 
96(251), 99(257), 104(263), 105(265), 106(266), 107(266), 108(268) 109(269), 
111(274), 112(276), 113(279), 114(285).
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